This paper analyzes the relationship between banks' divergent strategies toward specialization and diversi cation of nancial activities and their ability to withstand a banking sector crash. We rst generate market-based measures of banks' systemic risk exposures using extreme value analysis. Systemic banking risk is measured as the tail beta, which equals the probability of a sharp decline in a bank's stock price conditional on a crash in a banking index. Subsequently, the impact of (the correlation between) interest income and the components of non-interest income on this risk measure is assessed. The heterogeneity in extreme bank risk is attributed to differences in the scope of non-traditional banking activities: non-interest generating activities increase banks' tail beta. In addition, smaller banks and better-capitalized banks are better able to withstand extremely adverse conditions. These relationships are stronger during turbulent times compared to normal economic conditions. Overall, diversifying nancial activities under one umbrella institution does not
Introduction
The subprime crisis reminds us that, notwithstanding a period of disintermediation, the banking sector remains a particularly important sector for the stability of the nancial system. Moreover, disruptions in the smooth functioning of the banking industry tend to exacerbate overall uctuations in output. Consequently, banking crises are associated with signi cant output losses. It follows that preserving banking sector stability is of the utmost importance to banking supervisors. That is, regulators are especially interested in the frequency and magnitude of extreme shocks to the system which threaten the smooth functioning (and ultimately the continuity) of the banking system. Banking sector supervisors and central banks' main interest is to maintain and protect the value of their portfolio of banks in times of market stress. Thus it is interesting to study the factors contributing to the riskiness of the portfolio.
In this spirit, an extensive literature 1 reviews banking crises around the world, examining the developments leading up to the crises as well as policy responses. Initial research focussed on macro-prudential supervision and investigates the relationships between macro-economic conditions and banking system stability (see e.g. . However, not all banks need to contribute equally to the risk pro le of the supervisor's portfolio and the stability of the banking system. Nevertheless, research that zooms in at the micro-level and aims to identify bank-speci c characteristics of banking system stability is limited. Moreover, almost all evidence is based on analyzing the determinants of outright bank failures in the US (see e.g. Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1999, and the references in Appendix 1 of that paper; and Wheelock and Wilson, 2000) .
This paper investigates why some banks are better able to shelter themselves from the storm by analyzing the bank-speci c determinants of individual banks' contribution to systemic banking risk. Our research contributes to the banking literature in a number of ways. First, a crucial addition to the analysis is our measure of individual bank risk during extremely adverse economic conditions. More precisely, we estimate tail betas 3 pean banking sector stock price index. The choice of this measure is driven by two empirical stylized facts on banking panics. Historically, banking panics occurred when depositors initiated a bank run. In more recent periods, banks face a stronger disciplining role by stock market participants. As a consequence, equity and bond market signals are good leading indicators of bank fragility (Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes, 2006 ). Therefore, we employ a market-based measure. In addition, Gorton (1988) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) document that most banking panics have been related to systemic and macroeconomic uctuations rather than 'mass hysteria' or self-ful lling prophecies. Therefore, we look at the conditional rather than the unconditional probability of a crash in a bank's stock price. By measuring the tail beta for all listed European banks over different time periods we document the presence of substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity and time variation in the tail betas of European banks.
Second, we contribute to the debate on the scope of nancial rms by analyzing the impact of revenue diversity on banking system stability. In recent years, one of the major developments in the banking industry Stiroh, 2006) . We contribute to the empirical literature on revenue diversity of nancial corporations by addressing a third perspective, that of nancial stability. Our results establish that the shift to non-traditional banking activities, which generate commission, trading and other non-interest income, increases banks' tail betas and thus reduces banking system stability. Interest income is less risky than all other revenue streams. Other indicators of bank specialization in traditional intermediation, such as a higher interest margin or higher loans-to-asset ratio, corroborate the nding that traditional banking activities result in lower systemic banking risk. This questions the usefulness of nancial conglomeration as a risk diversi cation 4 device, at least in times of stock market turmoil. The results are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Wagner (2008) that even though diversi cation may reduce each bank's probability of default, it makes systemic crises more likely. However, we also document that the extent to which shocks to the various income shares are correlated matters for overall and extreme bank risk.
Third, we attribute a substantial degree of the time and cross-sectional heterogeneity to other bank-speci c characteristics. The variables we include capture the constituents of the CAMEL rating methodology, i.e.
Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management quality, Earnings, Liquidity. Appendix 1 of Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) provides an interesting overview of the variables used in selected empirical studies on US bank failures and also classi es these according to the constituents of the CAMEL rating. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) use similar variables to analyze why banks disappear. Smaller banks and well-capitalized banks contribute signi cantly to a safer banking system. In terms of economic impact, the latter results are somewhat larger than the gains from focussing on the traditional intermediation activities.
Finally, we show that the focus on extreme bank risk and banking system stability provides insights supplementary to the existing evidence on banks' riskiness in normal economic conditions. The information content of tail betas differs from measures focussing on central dependence or composite risk measures (such as longterm debt ratings or equity return volatility). We obtain, for instance, that higher capital buffers work best when they are needed the most, i.e. in times of stress.
The following section reviews relevant literature on banking system stability, the risk-taking incentives of nancial conglomerates and the impact of revenue diversity on bank risk. In Section 3, we discuss the sample composition. The next section describes the methodology to measure banks' tail betas. The subsequent section, Section 5, is divided into three subsections. The rst subsection introduces the results for the drivers of heterogeneity in systemic banking risk. In a panel set-up, we relate the tail betas to different types of nancial revenues and other bank-speci c variables. While these issues are always important, the magnitude of the recent nancial crisis renews interest in these questions. The second subsection documents that the information content of the tail beta differs signi cantly from the information contained in central dependence measures (such as the traditional OLS beta between bank stock returns and returns on a banking index). Subsection 5.3.
deals with re nements on the panel data set-up and robustness of the baseline regression. We show that the results are not driven by reverse causality or particular events (such as M&As, IPOs, delisting or banking crises) that may create a sample selection bias. Furthermore, we scrutinize the impact of composite risk measures (such as ratings or volatility) on the tail beta as well as control for the stability of the results in subsamples based on bank size. Section 6 concludes with policy implications.
2 Literature review 2.1 Banking regulation and systemic banking risk: selected literature
Systemic banking risk can be de ned as an event that affects a considerable number of nancial institutions in a strong sense, thereby severely impairing the general well-functioning of the nancial system. This wellfunctioning of the nancial system relates to the effectiveness and ef ciency with which savings are channelled into the real investments promising the highest returns (de Bandt and Hartmann, 2002) . Hence, historically, most of the banking regulation that was put in place was designed to reduce systemic risk.
In many countries, one of the most important measures to reduce systemic risk is currently capital regulation in the form of the Basel agreements. In all standard models of banking, high capital levels are associated with a lower bankruptcy risk (Santos, 2001 ). However, current regulation is based only on a bank's own risk and ignores the externalities of the bank's actions. Acharya (2009) shows that such regulation may leave the collective risk-shifting incentive unattended, and can, in fact, accentuate systemic risk. He concludes that prudential supervision should thus operate at a collective level, and regulate each bank such that the capital adequacy requirement is increasing in the individual risk of each bank as well as in the correlation of banks' risks.
Next to capital regulation, deposit insurance schemes are put in place to prevent bank runs by depositors.
Explicit deposit insurance has become increasingly popular, and a growing number of depositors around the world are now sheltered from the risk of bank failure. However, according to the ndings of Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), explicit deposit insurance may also be detrimental to bank stability, the more so where bank interest rates have been deregulated and where the institutional environment is weak. Hence, where institutions are good, opportunities for moral hazard are more limited, and more effective regulation and prudential supervision better offset the adverse incentives created by deposit insurance.
Regulation often tends to increase after a severe and systemic crisis. In the aftermath of the stock market 6 crash of 1929 and the Great Depression, the Banking Act of 1933, better known as the Glass-Steagall Act, separated the activities of commercial banks and investment banks. The idea behind it was twofold: rst, diffuse excessive concentration of nancial power in a limited number of large institutions, and second, prevent unsophisticated investors from being sold risky investments. However, over time there has been some deregulation.
The Glass-Steagall Act was abolished by a series of laws from the 1980s (relaxation of branching restrictions) until the late 1990s (culminating in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley in 1999). The main effect of this deregulation was permitting American banks to do what European banks had long been allowed to do, the combination of various types of nancial activities under one umbrella institution (since the Second Banking Directive of 1989). However, there is little theoretical or empirical guidance as to whether revenue diversity helps or harms banking system stability.
Revenue diversity and bank risk: selected literature
Most of the theoretical and empirical literature that studies the effects of combining different activities under one umbrella institution focus on the performance component. This focus on the bene t or discount that conglomeration creates can be justi ed for non-nancial corporations; however, the risk aspect is at least as important, if not more so, for nancial corporations. Unfortunately, little theoretical guidance exists on the impact of diversi ed revenue streams on the risk-taking behavior of nancial institutions. The main sources of the potential risk-reducing effects of revenue diversity are the less than perfect correlations between different activities (Dewatripont and Mitchell, 2005) and the organizational structure of the conglomerate (Freixas, Loranth and Morrison, 2007) . Wagner (2008) documents that diversi cation at nancial institutions entails a trade-off. Functional diversi cation may reduce idiosyncratic risk, but it also makes systemic crises more likely.
A number of authors empirically identify the impact of combining different nancial activities on a bank's risk pro le during normal economic conditions. Evidence for the US 2 documents that in the 1990s securities and insurance activities both had the potential to decrease conglomerate risk, but the effect largely depends on the type of diversifying activities that bank holding companies undertake. Expanding banks' activities may 2 Despite the fact that the scope for functional diversi cation has been deregulated earlier and more completely in Europe, most of the empirical evidence is based on US data. On the other hand, the volatility of market returns is signi cantly and positively affected by the reliance on non-interest income.
European banks that have moved into non-interest income activities present a higher level of risk than banks which mainly perform traditional intermediation activities (Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe, 2007) . Moreover, risk is mainly positively correlated with the share of fee-based activities but not with trading activities (Lepetit, Nys, Rous and Tarazi, 2008). Recent research linking the effect of diversi cation to market-based measures of performance and riskiness (and the risk/return trade-off) nds that banks with a higher share of non-interest income in total income are perceived to perform better in the long run (Baele et al., 2007) . However, this better performance is offset by higher systematic risk. Diversi cation of revenue streams from different nancial activities increases the systematic risk of banks i.e., the stock prices of diversi ed banks are more sensitive to normal uctuations in a general stock market index than non-diversi ed banks. Finally, using a worldwide Most of the available evidence identi es relationships between functional diversi cation and bank risk in normal economic conditions. However, it is not clear how diversi ed nancial institutions will behave in adverse economic situations and what the overall impact of revenue diversi cation on banking sector stability will be under these circumstances. This paper attempts to ll this void.
The sample
Since the purpose of the analysis is to investigate how diversity in bank revenue affects European banks' extreme systemic and systematic risk, we employ both accounting data and stock price information. We extract information from two data sources. For balance sheet and income statement data, we rely on the Bankscope database, which provides comparable information across countries. Bankscope does not provide stock price information on a daily basis; hence we use Datastream to obtain information on daily stock returns and market capitalization. We match both datasets on the basis of the ISIN-identi er (an identi cation system similar to the CUSIP number in the US and Canada) for the listed banks. Unfortunately, Bankscope does not provide the ISIN-number for delisted banks. For the delisted banks, we match the information from the two datasets using information on some basic accounting data (e.g. total assets, equity,... which are also provided by Datastream).
In a similar fashion, we verify the matching of the listed banks.
We carry out the analysis for the banks that have their headquarters in one of the countries of the European Union (before enlargement, i.e. with 15 member states). Our sample consists of both commercial banks and bank holding companies. The sample period is to a large extent xed by the availability of comparable data over time. While Bankscope contains information from 1987 onwards, the coverage is only substantial from the early nineties. Therefore, we perform the analysis on the sample period 1992-2007. The time span of the sample ensures that it contains periods with different business cycle conditions and stock market conditions.
We perform a number of selection criteria. First, we only include banks for which we can obtain at least six consecutive years of accounting and stock market information. This restriction is imposed because we use extreme value analysis to model extreme bank risk. In extreme value analysis, large samples are needed since only a fraction of the information is used in the estimations. Six consecutive years of daily stock prices yield at 9 least 1500 observations, a sample size that is feasible to apply extreme value analysis, though close to the lower bound 3 of the existing applications in nance. Second, following common practice in the nance literature, we impose a liquidity criterion on the stock returns. The rationale is that infrequently traded stocks may not absorb information accurately. We measure liquidity by the number of daily returns that are zero. However, in this analysis we can be rather mild on the imposed liquidity criterion. We only disregard stock if more than 60% of the daily returns are zero returns. Hence, we assume that although these bank stocks are very illiquid, their non-zero returns most likely re ect important, extreme events that are informative for our purposes. Moreover, their zero returns will not affect our estimates of extreme risk, since the tail of the distribution will still contain the extreme movements in banks' stock prices.
Due to delistings, IPOs, and mergers and acquisitions, our dataset is unbalanced. Some banks are only listed for six years whereas others have been operational and listed for a longer period. Comparing banks' behavior and risk pro le is only sensible if each bank's characteristics are measured over the same time interval. One possibility is to consider only those banks that are active (and listed) over the entire period. However, in this case, useful information on the other banks is neglected and may induce a selection bias. We opt for a different approach. We measure banks' extreme systemic risk exposures over moving windows of six years.
The rst period covers the years 1992-1997. In each subsequent subsample, we drop the observations of the initial sample year and add a more recent year of data. Since the sample period spans 16 years, we obtain 11 rolling subsamples of six years. Hence, at each point in time, we can meaningfully compare the cross-sectional differences in banks' risk pro le. In general, the composition of the bank set will be different in each subperiod.
4 A stock market-based measure of bank stability
As the stock market moves, each individual asset is more or less affected. The extent to which any asset participates in such general market moves determines that asset's systematic risk. In general, systematic risk is measured using a rm's beta and is computed by dividing the covariance between the rm's stock returns and the market return by the variance of the market returns. However, rms' exposure to systematic risk need not be constant over time. In particular, systematic risk exposures may vary over the business cycle or can be different in normal times versus times of market turbulence. While the combination of correlation-based methods and 3 We also perform the analysis on moving subsample of 8 years. The results are very similar.
assuming multivariate normality may yield acceptable results for central dependence measures, there exists abundant evidence that marginal and joint distributions of stock returns are not normally distributed, especially in the tail area. This might be solved by modelling the tail behavior with fat-tailed distributions. However, this requires distributional assumptions or knowledge of the underlying return processes. Choosing the wrong probability distribution may be problematic since correlations are non-robust to changing the underlying distributional assumptions of the return processes (Embrechts, Klüppelberg, Mikosch, 1999) . Moreover, many of the multivariate distributions lead to models that are non-nested, which cannot be tested against each other.
Extreme value analysis overcomes these problems. It enables estimation of marginal and joint tail behavior without imposing a particular distribution on the underlying returns.
In mathematical terms, we are interested in the following expression: P (X > x j Y > y). This expression captures the conditional probability that the return on one asset, X, exceeds a certain threshold x conditional on observing that the return on another asset, Y , exceeds y. This conditional probability re ects the dependence between two return series X and Y . We adopt the convention to take the negative of the return when outlining the methodology. x and y are thresholds in the tail of the distributions, such that they correspond with situations of large losses. In general, x and y may differ across stocks (especially in our analysis where Y is the return on a portfolio and X is single stock), but we impose that they correspond to outcomes that are equally (un)likely to occur. That is, the unconditional probability that an asset crashes equals
where Q x and Q y are quantiles.
The conditional co-crash probability can be rewritten as:
In general, X and Y can be the returns generated by any kind of asset. However, if the conditioning asset Y is a broad market or (banking) sector portfolio, the conditional probability can be seen as a tail extension of a regression based obtained in classical asset pricing models. The resulting co-crash probabilities provide an indication of extreme systematic or systemic bank risk. Hence, an asset's co-crash probability with the banking sector (or market), P (X > Q x (p) j Y > Q y (p)), will be labelled tail- (Straetmans et al., 2008) .
To obtain the tail-, we only need an estimate of the joint probability in the numerator. The denominator is determined by p. We implement the approach proposed by Ledford and Tawn (1996) and closely follow Hartmann et al. (2006) . This approach is semi-parametric and allows both for asymptotic dependence and asymptotic independence 4 . Hence, we can avoid making (wrong) distributional assumptions on the asset returns. The joint probability is determined by the dependence between the two assets and their marginal distributions. In order to extract information on the (tail) dependence, we want to eliminate the impact of the different marginal distributions. Therefore, we transform the original return series X and Y to series with a common marginal distribution. If one transforms the different return series to series with a common marginal distribution, the impact of marginals on the joint tail probabilities is eliminated. This means that differences in the conditional crash probabilities of banks are purely due to differences in the tail dependency of extreme returns.
The theoretical (a) and empirical (b) counterpart of transforming the stock returns to unit Pareto marginals 5 are based on the following equations:
where i = 1; :::; n and R Xi is the rank order statistic of return X i . Since e X i and e Y i have the same marginal distribution, it follows that the quantiles Q e x (p) and Q e y (p) now equal q = 1=p.
The transformation of the return series affects the numerator of the co-crash probability as follows:
Hence, the transformation to unit Pareto marginals reduces the estimation of the multivariate probability to a univariate set-up. The univariate exceedance probability of the minimum series of the two stock returns,
, can now be estimated using techniques that are standard in univariate extreme value analysis 6 .
The only assumption that has to be made is that the minimum series Z = min( e X; e Y ) also exhibits fat tails. 4 Asymptotic dependence means that the conditional tail probability de ned on (X; Y ) does not vanish in the bivariate tail. With asymptotic independence, the co-exceedance probability decreases as we move further into the bivariate tail. 5 Other transformations are also feasible. Poon et al. (2004) transform the return series to unit Fréchet marginals. However, the estimates have a larger bias for Fréchet distributions (Draisma, Drees, Ferreira and De Haan, 2004). 6 In the remainder of this section, we still use Z to refer to the return series. In our speci c case, Z is the series created by taking the minimum of e X and e Y . Note, however, that Z may also be the return series of a single (untransformed) stock if one wants to model unconditional tail risk.
Univariate tail probabilities for fat-tailed random variables can be estimated by the semi-parametric probability estimator from De Haan, Jansen, Koedijk and de Vries. (1994):
Z n m;n is the "tail cut-off point", which equals the (n m) th ascending order statistic, in a sample of size n, of the newly created minimum series Z. The advantage of this estimator is that one can extend the crash levels outside the domain of the observed, realized returns. Note that the tail probability estimator is conditional upon the tail index and a choice of the number of tail observations used, m. This tail index captures the decay in the probability with which ever more extreme events occur (jointly). A relatively high tail index corresponds with a relatively low probability of extreme events. The tail index is traditionally estimated using the Hill estimator (1975):
In this equation, Z n j;n denotes the (n j)-th ascending order statistic from the return series Z 1 ; :::; Z n .
The parameter m is a threshold that determines the sample fraction on which the estimation is based (i.e. A drawback of this method is that it only provides an unbiased measure of the tail index without specifying the optimal sample fraction m. However, this info is still needed to compute the univariate crash probabilities b p q . Therefore, after estimating the optimal b , we perform an automated grid search to nd a stable region in the Hill plot that is as close as possible to the optimal tail index. m is then taken as the midpoint from this region.
Combining equations (1), (4), and (5) allows computing the extreme systematic risk measure, tail-:
We will estimate this tail-for listed European banks observed over multiple time periods to get an indication of the time evolution and the cross-sectional dispersion in banks' extreme risk sensitivities. The estimated tail betas provide insights in the dependence of events that happen with a certain probability p. In this section and in the remainder of the paper, we model extreme events that happen with a probability of 0:04%. Given that we are using daily data, a probability of 0:04% corresponds to a situation that occurs on average once every 10 years (= (250 p) 1 ). The probability of the event obviously affects the severity. More likely events are associated with less severe crashes. How does the level of p affect the tail-? This depends on the estimated tail dependence coef cient (the tail index of the joint tail). Asymptotic dependence ( = 1) implies that the conditional tail probability converges to a non-zero constant. However, asymptotic independence (
results in vanishing co-crash probabilities in the joint tail. In our sample, both asymptotic dependence and independence are present. Hence, for the latter, the tail-will be larger for less extreme events. For example, setting the crash probability at p=0:001, a level corresponding to the Basel II guidelines, results in less severe events but higher tail betas. In the remainder of the paper, we relate tail betas to bank-speci c characteristics.
We x p at 0:04%. Nevertheless, we also experimented with probabilities in the range of [0:004%; 0:4%], re-14 sulting in events that happen as infrequently as once every 100 years to yearly events. All reported results with respect to the determinants of tail risk are similar (and are available upon request).
Measuring systemic banking risk: results
We are interested in assessing the extent to which individual banks are exposed to an aggregate shock, as captured by an extreme downturn in a broad European banking sector index. For each bank stock (as well as the bank index), we calculated daily returns as the percentage changes in the return index. All series are expressed in local currency to prevent distortion by exchange rate uctuations.
Before showing the estimated tail betas, we provide insight in the severity of the events that we are modelling. That is, we rst report the unconditional Value-at-Risk levels or quantiles associated with probability p = 0:04%. Doing so, we exploit one of the main bene ts of modelling the entire tail of the (joint) distribution. We are looking at events that happen less frequently than the observed sample length. We summarize the ndings on the unconditional Value-at-Risk levels in Table 1 . In order to get these crash magnitudes, we rst estimate the tail index for each individual series using the modi ed Hill estimator, Eq. . Hence, lower probability events will cause an increase in the absolute value of the crash level, whereas events that occur more frequently (at least in terms of extreme value analysis) will lead to lower crash magnitudes.
< Insert Table 1 around here > Table 1 [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] . In this period, the daily loss in market value associated with a 0:04% probability event exceeded 11:6% for half of the banks in the sample. In ve of the eleven periods under consideration, the median daily VaR was also lower or equal to 11%. The mean VaR is almost always larger (in absolute value) than the median VaR and the gap between the two is larger in the initial sample years. Similar information can be extracted from the standard deviation. The standard deviation is indicative for the cross-sectional dispersion.
The standard deviation has decreased from values around 0:08 to less than 0:04 (though increasing again in the last period, [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . This is caused both by a decrease in the crash magnitude of the riskiest banks and an increase in the riskiness of the (unconditionally) safest banks.
Panel C of Table 1 is constructed in a similar fashion as panel B and presents the expected shortfall. The expected shortfall is the average amount that is lost in a one-day period, assuming that the loss is lower than the 0:04 th percentile of the return distribution. The median expected shortfall uctuates around daily losses of 15%, but there are large differences across banks.
The comparison of the estimated VaR (and the expected shortfall) of the European banking sector index (reported in panel A) and the mean (or median) crash level (expected shortfall) of the bank stock returns shows that most bank stocks have a higher downside risk potential than the banking index. This need not be surprising since we are comparing losses on a single asset with losses on a broad portfolio. The mean daily crash level is often 50% higher than the VaR of the European banking sector index. When looking at the percentiles over the different time periods, we observe that, in almost all time periods, 75% of the banks may fear a larger drop (expected shortfall) in its stock price than the equally unlikely crash (expected shortfall) in the banking sector portfolio. In the remainder of the paper, we investigate the properties and drivers of tail betas between bank stock returns and EU banking sector returns. In general, we will be interested in events that are as severe as the value-at-risk and expected shortfall gures reported in Table 1 .
< Insert Table 2 around here > Table 2 provide an indication of the cross-sectional dispersion in the extreme systemic bank risk of the listed European banks.
For each subsample, we report various percentiles, the mean and the standard deviation. The reported values are percentages. Hence, the mean of the European banks' tail-in the rst period indicates that there is a 7:4% probability that a European bank's stock price will crash, given that the banking market 7 as a whole crashes.
To put it differently, given that there is a large downturn in the EU banking index, on average one out of 13 banks will experience an equally unlikely extreme stock price decline on that day. Recall that the level of the crashes does not need to be the same for the bank stock return and the conditioning asset (the European banking sector index). We rather look at crashes that have a similar probability of occurrence (set at 0:04%). In order to get some intuition on this number, it is interesting to relate this conditional probability to the results reported in Table 1 . Given that there is a market correction in the European banking index of 5:3%, there is a 7:4%
probability that the European banks will be confronted with an average fall in their share price of 11:7%. 7 For each bank's tail beta, the value-weighted banking index excludes the respective bank.
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The rst and last column reveal that systemic bank risk is quite similar in both subsamples. The mean tail-more than doubles in the second subperiod. In four of the 11 subperiods, the tail beta exceeds 15%. Moreover, Table 1 shows that in these four periods, the unconditional VaR was also higher. Hence, not only is the tail beta higher, the magnitude of the crash would be more severe as well. In the other periods, the mean value of banks' extreme systemic risk approximates 10% or more. In each subsample, there is a lot of cross-sectional heterogeneity. The inter-quartile range (the difference between the 25th and 75th percentile)
uctuates over time but is often larger than 15%. In some subperiods, the range is even 20%. Furthermore, the mean tail beta exceeds the median at each point in time. This indicates that the distribution of the tail betas is skewed. It seems that many banks have low probabilities and are thus only moderately vulnerable to aggregated banking shocks. In fact, in each period, some banks have a tail-(with respect to a broad European banking index) below 0:04%, which is the unconditional crash probability. This means that these bank stocks banks. This is substantially higher than the mean tail-we obtain in each subperiod. This is already a rst indication that larger banks will have higher tail betas.
5 The bank-speci c determinants of banking system stability Table 2 reveals that the tail-s can be quite different across banks and over time. This observation is of interest to bank supervisors who care about overall banking sector stability. However, next to knowing the evolution as well as the dispersion, it is even more interesting to get insight into the potential drivers of banking system stability. The drivers of cross-sectional heterogeneity in tail betas are analyzed by relating them to bank-speci c variables. We have to take into account that the dependent variable is a probability. In such a case, the model E(T AIL jX ) = X does not provide the best description of E(T AIL jX ). Since the observations are constrained within the unit interval, [0; 1], the effect of X on T AIL cannot be constant over the range of X. Moreover, the predicted values from an OLS regression can never be guaranteed to be bound in the unit interval. In order to obtain that the tted values after a comparative static analysis also result in probabilities, we need to employ a generalized linear model (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996; Kieschnick and McCullough,2003) ,
where g(:) is a link function such that g(X ) is constrained within the unit interval. A natural candidate for the link function is the logistic transformation, g(X ) = exp(X ) 1+exp(X ) , also labelled the log odds ratio 8 .
The independent variables, X, are averages over a six-year interval to match the time interval over which the dependent variable is estimated. We apply robust regression techniques 9 to control for outliers in the dataset. Moreover, in each regression, we include time dummies as well as country xed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity 10 in a given period or at the country level. Furthermore, the pooling of cross-sectional and time-series data implies that multiple observations on a given bank are not independent. Therefore, a robust estimation method that controls for groupwise heteroscedasticity is used. We cluster the standard errors at the country level 11 . Finally, for many banks, we obtain observations for several, but not all, subperiods, which 8 Next to the logistic transformation, we also consider other appropriate transformations such as the probit and the (complementary) log-log link functions. The results are largely unaffected. All speci cations yield a similar t and statistical tests cannot discriminate in favour of a speci c link function. We follow common practice and opt for the logistic link function. This link function is used most frequently when explaining fractional response variables. 9 Robust regression is a form of iterated weighted least squares regression. Two types of weights are used: Huber (1981) weighting and biweighting. The two different kinds of weight are used because Huber weights can have dif culties with severe outliers, and biweights can have dif culties converging or may yield multiple solutions (Berk, 1990 and Stata 10, 2007) . Using the Huber weights rst helps to minimize problems with the biweights. 10 We could also interact the time and country dummy to absorb the entire impact of variables that equally affect all banks in a country in a given period (such as: the macro-economic environment, the regulatory framework, the corporate default rate). However, some of these variables (especially regarding the regulatory framework) are not available over the period 1992-2007. Neglecting them may create an omitted variable bias. Interacting both dummy variables does not affect the coef cients of interest (or their signi cance).
We did not include bank-speci c xed effects, which correspond to de-meaning the variables at the bank level. However, low variability in the de-meaned values of the independent variables makes it more dif cult (if not impossible) to estimate the coef cients and establish signi cant relationships. If the variance is low, these regressions may contain very little information about the parameters of interest, even if the cross-sectional variation is large (Arellano, 2003) . 11 The panel data at hand have three dimensions. This may result in residuals that are correlated across observations, which will cause OLS standard errors to be biased. We are primarily interested in knowing how different nancial activities affect banking system stability.
Since the Second Banking Directive of 1989, banks are allowed to operate broad charters by diversifying functionally. Diversi ed banks provide a broad array of nancial services, from granting loans, underwriting and distributing securities and insurance policies, to managing mutual funds and so on. Unfortunately, detailed data on banks' exposure to each of the aforementioned activities is in general not available. Therefore a pragmatic de nition of functional diversi cation is used. More speci cally, we will focus our analysis on the differential impact that different revenue sources may have on banks' tail betas. Total operating income is divided into four revenue classes. They are: net interest income, net commission and fee income, net trading income, and net other operating income. These sources of non-interest income capture all income from nontraditional intermediation. Moreover, this publicly available information is used by analysts and investors to assess the long-term performance potential and risk pro le of a bank. We distinguish banks based on their observed revenue mix. Each type of revenue is expressed as a share of total operating income. As a result, the shares of net interest income, net commission and fee income, net trading income and net other operating income sum to one. Therefore, the share of net interest income is left out of the regression equation.
The baseline regression is speci ed as follows:
Hence, a signi cant coef cient on any of the other revenue shares ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ) means that these activities contribute differently to banks' tail beta than do interest-generating activities. Following Mercieca et al. (2007) and Stiroh (2004b), we also account for diversi cation between the major activities interest income and nonor almost equal to the standard errors obtained when clustered at the bank level. The importance of the time effect (after including time dummies) is small in this data set. Standard errors clustered at the time dimension are not higher than unclustered ones. Moreover, when we cluster the errors in two dimensions (bank-time or country-time), they are almost identical to the standard errors clustered only by the corresponding cross-section level (bank or country). An alternative way to estimate the regression coef cients and standard errors when the residuals are not independent is the Fama-MacBeth approach (Fama and MacBeth, 1973) . The adjusted Fama-MacBeth standard errors are higher than the unadjusted. However, in general, they do not exceed the standard errors obtained when we cluster at the country level.
From this, we conclude that clustering the standard errors in the country dimension is the preferred approach. Besides investigating the impact of revenue diversity, we also include a number of other bank-speci c char-
acteristics, e X, that are similar in spirit to the constituent parts of the CAMELS rating used by US supervisory authorities. Summary statistics on the accounting variables are reported in Table 3 . These variables capture strategic choices made by bank managers that may affect a bank's risk pro le.
< Insert Table 3 around here >
The equity capital ratio and the liquid assets-to-total assets ratio are included to incorporate the possibility that better capitalized and more liquid institutions may be less vulnerable to market-wide events. We also take into account differences in bank ef ciency by including the cost-to-income ratio. This ratio measures the overheads or costs of running the bank, the major element of which is normally salaries, as a percentage of income generated before provisions. Finally, bank size and bank pro tability are also included. We include (the log of) bank size to allow for the possibility that larger banks may be more exposed to market-wide events. Bank pro tability is included to control for a risk-return trade-off. Both measures are, to a large extent, outcomes of strategy choices made by banks and are hence highly correlated with the other control variables, and, more importantly, with the measures of functional diversi cation. Therefore, we orthogonalize them with respect to all other variables to derive the pure effects of size and pro ts 12 . As a result, the coef cients on the other variables capture the full effect on banks' tail-. We also include two dummy variables in the baseline 12 The pro tability measure is regressed on all independent variables, except size. The residuals of this regression are used as a measure of excess pro ts above what is driven by banks' operational choices and are by de nition orthogonal to these bank-speci c variables. The natural logarithm of total assets is regressed on all independent variables including return on equity. The idea is to decompose bank size in an organic growth component and a historical size component, the residual.
regression, one for bank holding companies and one for large and complex banking groups 13 (LCBGs). LCBGs are banking groups whose size and nature of business is such that their failure and inability to operate would most likely have adverse implications for nancial intermediation, the smooth functioning of nancial markets, or other nancial institutions.
The next subsection presents the estimation results of the general speci cation. In the subsequent subsection, we explore how the information content of tail-betas differs from that of central dependence measures.
In the last subsection, we verify the appropriateness of the baseline equation from a methodological and an economic point of view.
Baseline regression results
The results 14 shown in column 1 of Table 4 re ect the relationships between various bank-speci c variables and banks' tail beta measure. The tail beta measures the probability of observing a correction in a bank's equity return conditional on observing a large drop in the European Union banking sector index. From Table   4 , it can be seen that interest income is less risky than all other revenue streams. This can be inferred from the observation that the coef cients of all other revenue shares are positive. This means that the alternative revenue streams have a bigger impact on banks' extreme risk measures than those originating from traditional intermediation activities. Put differently, the tail beta of a diversi ed bank is higher than the tail beta of a bank specialized in interest-generating activities. The coef cient on the share of trading income is the largest of the non-traditional revenue sources and its impact differs signi cantly from the other shares. The estimation results reveal that other indicators of bank specialization in traditional intermediation corroborate the nding that traditional banking activities result in lower systemic risk. Hence, we can conclude that banks that focus 13 More information on how to obtain the set of LCBGs can be found in a special feature article of the ECB Financial Stability Review of December 2006. Based on a multiple indicator approach, i.e. cluster analysis, 33 banking groups are identi ed as LCBGs. 24 of these are located in the EU15, but not all of them are listed. 14 The baseline results are obtained for a restricted sample of commercial banks and bank holding companies. We impose two restrictions on the sample used in the baseline. First, we eliminated non-diversi ed/specialized banks from the sample. That is, we only include banks with an interest income share between 10% and 90%. Furthermore, we also eliminate fast-growing banks. For these banks, the correlation between each pair of growth rates of the different revenue types may be biased and overstate the true degree of revenue correlation. In the robustness section, we document that these restrictions have little impact on the baseline results.
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on lending activities are less exposed to systemic banking risk than diversi ed banks 15 .
< Insert Table 4 around here >
The diversi cation measures do not enter the equation signi cantly. Apparently, having a more equallybalanced portfolio of revenue streams (either between interest and non-interest income or within non-interest income revenue) seems not to reduce or increase a bank's tail beta. On the other hand, the extent to which the growth rates of the various revenue streams are correlated does play an important role. The signi cant coef cients are positive, as portfolio theory predicts. Imperfectly correlated revenue streams should reduce bank risk. A low correlation between shocks to interest income and trading income reduces banks' tailsigni cantly. Furthermore, a low correlation between shocks of any of the non-interest income types also contributes positively to overall banking system stability. These results imply that even though banks may have equal revenue shares, their risk pro le may be substantially different depending on the correlation 16 between the revenue types.
The other bank-speci c variables also reveal interesting relationships. Size is by far the most signi cant driver of banks' tail betas. Recall that the conditioning event is a crash in the European banking index, excluding the bank for which we compute the tail beta to avoid spurious results. Larger banks are inherently more exposed to many sectors in many countries and are hence more tied to European-wide shocks. Large drops in small banks' stock price are more likely to be idiosyncratic events or are more tied to local factors since small banks are predominantly active in their home country. In addition to the size effect, the dummy for Large and Complex Banking Groups is also associated with higher tail betas. In recent years, mergers, acquisitions and organic growth have meant that some of the largest and most complex nancial groups have come to transcend national boundaries and traditionally de ned businesslines. As a result, they have become a potential channel for the cross-border and cross-market transmission of nancial shocks (Hawkesby, Marsh and Stevens, 2007). Apparently, the banks at the heart of the nancial system, which need to be monitored closely, contribute negatively to banking system stability. To check that the main results of the paper are not just a result of comparing small and large banks, we report in the robustness section results for various equally large subsamples (based on bank size). The capital-to-asset ratio exhibits the expected sign and is signi cant.
A larger capital buffer increases a bank's contribution to banking system stability. Ef ciency and liquidity do not enter the equation signi cantly. Banks that generate high pro ts ('in excess of their fundamentals') are much riskier. This mirrors the common risk-return trade-off. The causality in this relationship may, however, run in the other direction. Banks may gamble and increase their exposure to risky activities that may yield higher pro ts. A similar critique may hold for other relationships as well.
Next to return on equity, the equity-to-asset ratio may also suffer from reverse causality if banks' capital buffers are eroded from unexpected losses due to the more riskier income activity. Some of the relationships may be plagued by endogeneity. That is, the relationships could occur if riskier banks engage in non-traditional banking activities, rather than the reverse. Finally, given that the risk measure is based on stock market values, there might be a spurious relationship between trading income and tail betas. These possibilities can be checked by looking at the initial values of the ratio at the beginning of that six-year period rather than the average values over the six years. In Column 3 of Table 4 , all accounting variables are measured as initial values. Some interesting conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, trading income is still signi cant, which indicates that trading income causally affects bank risk. The other alternative revenue shares also remain signi cant.
Second, return on equity has a lower impact. This indicates that part of the risk-return relationship is due to the higher pro ts that risky activities generate. The bank's average pro ts over that period will be higher if a bank takes on more risk (as measured over a six year period). Nevertheless, the initial pro tability level is also signi cantly and positively related to a bank's tail beta. Finally, a bank's initial capital ratio signi cantly reduces its exposure to systemic banking risk. The tail betas of banks that are nancially strong banks at the beginning of the period are less affected by a crash in the EU banking sector index. In the last subsection, we document that these results are robust to potential reverse causality or endogeneity created by events such as mergers and acquisitions, delistings, or systemic crises.
Analyzing the economic impact of revenue diversi cation on banking system stability Until now, we focussed the description of the results on the interpretation of the sign and the signi cance.
To assess the magnitude of the coef cients and their economic impact we have to rely on tted marginal effects. Both the (logistic) link function and the level of the variables affect the estimated effect of a change in one variable on the tail-. That is:
In column 2 of Table 4 , we report the marginal effects of each variable when the expression in Equation (9) A bank that keeps its revenue shares unchanged, but would be faced with less correlated interest income and trading income, will observe a drop in its tail-. If this correlation drops from the sample mean (0:178) to that of the 5 th percentile ( :767), the tail beta will be almost 2:6 basis points lower. Hence, both the type of income and their correlation play an important role in increasing banking system stability.
Controlling for non-traditional banking activities, we discover that a larger capital buffer in nancial institutions will exert a mitigating effect on systemic risk. An increase of the equity-to-assets ratio of 0:05 will result, all else equal, in a drop in the tail beta of 3 basis points. Bank size is by far the most important contributor to heterogeneity in tail risk. Consider two banks that only differ in size, one bank has the average size while the value of the total assets of the other bank is xed at the 75 th percentile. The difference in tail-exceeds 0:05.
The larger bank will have, all else equal, a 5% higher probability of a large drop in its stock return if there is a large, negative shock to the European banking sector index. This increase equals a substantial proportion ofthe average tail-. Depending on the time period, an increase with ve basis points corresponds to 30% of the average tail-in 1994-1999 and 50% of the average tail-in 1999-2004. In addition, LCBGs have a tail beta that is, all else equal, 4:6 basis points higher.
The marginal effects are not constant; they depend on the values at which X is evaluated. Hence, although the argument within the link function is a parsimonious linear model, we are able to capture both non-linear relationships and interaction effects. On the one hand we can compute the marginal effect of a change in the variable X i for different values of X i while xing the values of the other variables (at e.g. their sample mean).
We learn that the implied effects differ substantially when they are assessed at other values than the mean.
The marginal effect of a change in one of the revenue shares increases monotonously with the value of that variable. But the slope differs across the revenue shares. The impact of other operating income only increases moderately, largely due to the smaller range over which this revenue share is observed. The marginal effect of an increase in the trading income share on banks' tail beta is 0:38 at the sample mean (which is 6% of total income). The impact is around 0:30, if an otherwise equal bank only derives a small proportion (1%) of its income from trading activities. On the other hand, a bank with an even greater reliance on trading income, 16%
of total operating income, will have a marginal effect of 0:60, which is two times larger than the bank in the latter case.
On the other hand, we are also able to assess the impact of a change in X i for banks that only differ with respect to another variable X j . Consider again the benchmark values of the average bank (as reported in column 2 of Table 4 ). At the mean trading income share, the marginal effect is 0:38. Since a larger capital buffer reduces banks' tail beta, the impact will be larger for less capitalized banks. The differential impact between the low and high capital ratio banks is 0:09 at the sample mean of trading income. This impact gap widens for banks that are more heavily involved in trading income generating activities and is for instance 0:13 when the trading income share is 16%. Put differently, in order to experience similar marginal effects of an increase in trading income, a better capitalized bank may already be more involved in this riskier revenue source. This con rms the presence of an interaction effect between the degree of capitalization and a bank's involvement in non-interest generating activities. Consequently, one could argue that regulatory capital requirements should be related to banks' reliance on trading income. Similarly, bank size is an important contributor in explaining differences in heterogeneity in bank tail risk. The marginal impact differs substantially for large and small 26 banks. The interaction effects are even more apparent, especially for commission and trading income. The gap in marginal impacts of an increase in non-interest generating activities (in small versus large banks) widens substantially for larger shares of the associated revenue type.
Tail dependence versus central dependence
We are interested in assessing the extent to which individual banks are exposed to a severe aggregate shock, as captured by an extreme downturn in the EU banking sector index. For that purpose, multivariate extreme value analysis is a well-suited technique since it accounts for the fat tails that are inherent to stock prices and it is not tied to speci c distributional assumptions. In general, most authors focus on risk during normal conditions.
Dependency in the center of the distribution is typically measured using a rm's beta or a correlation coef cient, which both describe the sensitivity of an asset's returns to broad market or (bank) sector movements. While First, the rank correlation between the tail beta and the ordinary beta is very high. Across the eleven time windows of six years, it uctuates in the range of 50% to 75%. Hence, banks with a large exposure to movements in the banking index in normal economic conditions will be more exposed to extreme movements as well. The high correlation implies that both dependence measures share an important component. Second, we establish signi cant relationships between non-traditional banking activities and systemic bank risk exposures (see Column 1 of Table 4 and 5). We run similar regressions, but substitute the dependent variable. The results are reported in Columns 2 of Table 5 .
< Insert Table 5 around here >
The tail beta is replaced as dependent variable by the OLS beta (obtained by regressing bank returns on returns on an EU banking index). We discover similar relationships. All non-interest generating activities increase the exposure of banks' stock returns to movements in the EU banking index. The impact of trading income is signi cantly larger than the impact of commission income and other operating income. Contrary 27 to expectations, banks' OLS beta will be higher the more equal are the shares of interest and non-interest income. The coef cient on HHI REV is negative and signi cant. The six measures of the correlation between shocks to pairs of income shares are all positively related to the OLS beta of a bank's stock return. Five of them are statistically signi cant. The largest potential for risk reduction can be obtained by combining imperfectly correlated interest and commission income generating activities. Furthermore, larger banks and less-capitalized banks have higher betas. In light of the previous nding, the high correlation between central and tail dependence measures, these observations are far from surprising. The more interesting issue is whether bank characteristics, and especially bank's income structure, can explain the residual heterogeneity in the tailthat is not explained by central dependence measures.
Therefore, we add the OLS beta to the baseline regression (Column 3 of Table 5 ). Doing so, we want to decompose the effect of bank-speci c variables on the tail betas into a direct effect and an indirect effect. The direct effects are the estimated relationships between a variable and the tail-beta. The indirect effect captures how a variable affects risk both in normal and extreme conditions and runs through the impact of the central dependence measure. Due to the large positive correlation, we expect and nd a highly signi cant relationship between the traditional dependence measure and the tail beta. Hence, an increase in, for instance, the share of commission or trading income will indirectly result in an increase of the tail beta. If any of the bank-speci c variables exhibit a signi cant 17 relationship with the tail beta, this implies that there is a direct effect that increases extreme bank risk in addition to the indirect effect.
When the central dependence measures are taken into account, we obtain that all non-traditional banking activities contribute positively to systemic banking risk. However, only the share of trading income in total income is signi cant at the conventional signi cance levels. Furthermore, a stronger correlation between shocks to other operating income and both other non-interest income sources, as well as between interest income and trading income, increases banks' tail-. Measures of bank size and bank pro tability are signi cant and hence enforce the positive indirect effect. Fourth, in column 4 Table 5 , we report a joint effect 18 , which is the sum of the direct (coef cients in Column 3) and indirect effect (coef cient on the central dependence measure times 17 From Column 2 of Table 5 , we learn that many bank-speci c variables have a large partial correlation coef cient with the central dependence measure. This may create a multicollinearity problem and hence harms nding signi cant relationships by in ating the standard errors in Column 3 of Table 5 . Therefore, we focus more on the magnitude of the coef cient rather than the signi cance level. 18 The joint effects are, as expected, similar in magnitude to the coef cients reported in Column 1.
the estimated coef cients in Column 2). It is interesting to compare the direct effects, the coef cients in Column 3, with the joint effects in Column 4. For instance, the direct effect of an increase in commission income, trading income, or other operating income on a bank's extreme risk pro le is larger than the indirect effect.
The impact of correlated shocks also works predominantly via the direct effect. Reassuring for bank capital regulation is that the stabilizing impact of large capital buffers is stronger in turbulent times than in normal economic conditions.
To conclude, we discover a high correlation between banks' systemic risk exposures in normal and stress periods. Furthermore, the shift to non-traditional banking activities has increased banks' OLS beta and as a consequence their tail beta. However, there is also an additional and, for most variables, an even larger direct effect on banks' tail betas. The information content of tail betas differs from measures focussing on central dependence. In the robustness section, we also show that the information content of tail betas differs from other composite risk measures such as long-term debt ratings or equity return volatility.
Support for the baseline equation
Many banks are not included in all subperiods. Hence, the panel data set is unbalanced. If selection in the sample occurs randomly, then the results of the baseline regression are not subject to bias. However, some sources of sample selection are potentially non-random and may affect the estimated relationships. First, bank stocks that are traded infrequently are excluded since the risk measure will not be informative. Furthermore, some banks either entered the sample after an IPO or dropped out due to a delisting. These three events have in common that accounting data are available for the entire period but stock price information is not available or useful for the entire period 1992-2007. Another important source of unbalancedness are mergers and acquisitions. We examine the aforementioned selection issues simultaneously 19 . The estimation results are documented in Table 6 . Column 1 contains the results for a substantially reduced sample. The sample 19 We can also estimate a Heckman (1976) selection model for these events. Given that we consider multiple selection events, we implement a two-step procedure. Initially, we estimate three different selection equations (probit regressions). The dummy is one if that bank-time observation is included in the nal sample and zero otherwise. Subsequently, we compute the Inverse Mills ratio (or selection hazard) for each selection equation and incorporate them in the baseline equation. We obtain that none of the Inverse Mills ratios is signi cant at the traditional signi cance levels. Accounting for non-randomness in the sample selection alters the marginal effects (slightly) but not the signi cance.
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size reduces to 530 observations as a result of dropping banks that are involved in one or more of the selection criteria. In column 2, we report results for the initial sample size but include (not reported) dummy variables for the various potential sample selection problems. The results do not change qualitatively, an exception being the loss of signi cance of the other operating income share. However, in the smaller sample almost all coef cients are larger in absolute value. Regarding the dummy variables, we observe that banks whose shares are traded infrequently have lower tail betas. These banks are typically smaller banks, which strengthens the ndings on bank size. To conclude, although the panel dataset is unbalanced, the sources of the missing values in the dataset do not affect the relationships of interest.
< Insert Table 6 around here > Some European countries confronted a banking crisis 20 in the beginning of the nineties. Especially for the Scandinavian countries, the crises in the banking industry were severe in terms of output loss as a percentage of GDP. Given the focus on heterogeneity in banks' extreme risk pro les, these unusual events may drive the results. In column 3 of Table 6 , we exclude a bank-time observation if this bank has been active in a country that experienced a banking crisis during one of the six years of that time frame. The results reported in Column 6 show that including the crisis periods does not affect the results (again, except for the share of other operating income in total income). The coef cients on the alternative revenue shares and the correlation coef cients are of a similar magnitude as those reported in Table 4 , which further strengthens the stability of our ndings.
The independent variables proxy strategic choices made by banks and capture information on capital, management, earnings and liquidity. Similar information might be contained in aggregated proxies of bank behavior, such as ratings or market-based information. In fact, the results in Table 5 document that there is indeed a relationship between bank's beta in normal and stress times, but that many independent variables have an additional impact. In columns 4-6, we include a rating on long-term bank debt, a measure of idiosyncratic volatility of banks' equity returns, and total volatility of bank equity returns. Concerning column 4 of Table 6 , we follow Pop (2006) and construct the mean of long-term issuer ratings assigned by S&P, Moody's and Fitch. Before 20 Information on the timing and magnitude of the crisis is obtained from the Worldbank Database of Banking Crises (Caprio, 2003) .
Six countries experienced a banking crisis during the sample period: Denmark (1992), Finland (1992 Finland ( -1994 , France (1994 France ( -1995 , Greece (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) , Italy (1992 Italy ( -1995 and Sweden (1992 Sweden ( -1995 . Note that we only report the years that occur in the sample period, some crises started earlier.
averaging, the ratings are rst converted to cardinal values using Pop's scale. The lower the cardinal value, the more creditworthy is the issuer. Including this rating reduces the sample size considerably to 360 observations.
The coef cient on the long-term rating is measured imprecisely and is hence insigni cant. More important, the results regarding the other coef cients are almost unaltered. Changes with respect to the baseline are the following: the coef cient on the other operating income share reduces considerably. Return on equity is only marginally signi cant, but this is due to the larger standard error because of the smaller sample rather than a change in the coef cient. All other coef cients are of equal size compared to the baseline regression without the rating, but the standard errors are larger. From column 5 and 6 of Table 6 , we can infer that aggregate market-based measures of bank risk are not related to the tail beta. The results in both columns are almost exactly equal. The coef cient on the liquid assets to total assets ratio is slightly higher in the regression with total volatility. This, combined with a smaller standard error, yields a signi cant and positive relationship between this ratio and the tail beta. Apparently, additional measures of bank risk (total volatility, idiosyncratic volatility, rating on long term debt) do not enter the equation signi cantly nor do they affect the estimated coef cients on the other variables. This further underlines the fact that the information content of tail betas is different from other proxies of risk.
One of the most signi cant variables in determining tail betas is bank size. To check that the main results of the paper are not just a result of comparing small and large banks, we redo the analysis for various subsamples.
We rank the banks according to size and split the sample in three equally large subsamples. The mean bank size of the smallest third is 7; 989 million euro. The average bank in the middle group has 54; 025 million euro of total assets. Average total assets in the group of large banks equals 241; 680 million euro. Performing the analysis on the three different subsamples does indeed yield further insights. We present the results in columns 1-3 of Table 7 . First, many of the obtained results hold for each subsample. Larger banks, less capitalized banks, LCBGs and banks with a large share of trading income have higher tail betas. Second, the impact of commission income and other operating income on tail betas is signi cant for the subsets of small and medium-sized banks, but not for the subsample of the largest banks. For the largest banks, only trading income is perceived as a more risky revenue stream. Third, the impact of the correlation between pairs of revenue streams is largely similar across the three different subsamples. Fourth, the effect of cost-to-income and diversi cation (HHI-revenue) on tail betas differs substantially in the three subsamples. That is, we observe signi cant relationships with opposite signs, which is probably causing the insigni cance of these variables in the overall sample. From this we can conclude that the baseline results are not merely a result of comparing small and large banks. Nevertheless, looking at various subsamples of banks with different size yields further insights into the determinants of systemic banking risk.
< Insert Table 7 around here >
The baseline results are obtained for a sample of commercial banks and bank holding companies. However, since the purpose of this research is to investigate the impact of diversi cation strategies on banking stability, we further imposed two restrictions on the sample used in the baseline. First, we eliminated non-diversi ed banks from the sample. That is, we only include banks with an interest income share between 10% and 90%. Banks not satisfying this criterion are categorized as too specialized. Furthermore, we also eliminate fast-growing banks. For these banks, the correlation between each pair of growth rates of the different revenue types may be biased and overstate the true degree of revenue correlation. Column 4 of Table 7 reports the results when we drop these restrictions and hence employ the full sample of commercial banks and bank holding companies. In this case, the sample size increases by 10% to 980 observations. All results established in Table 4 still hold.
However, in the full sample the magnitude of the impact of the equity-to-asset ratio is substantially reduced (but still signi cant). In addition, we obtain that the Her ndahl Hirschmann index of the non-interest generating activities is negatively and signi cantly related to banks' tail-. This unexpected result indicates that banks' risk pro le will be improved if they focus their non-interest income. However, this is predominantly caused by a few banks that derive more than 90% of their income from non-traditional banking activities and should therefore be considered as outliers in a sample of commercial banks and BHCs.
Finally, we perform two robustness checks in which we zoom in on the dependent variable. First, we acknowledge that the dependent variable is an estimated variable and may hence be subject to measurement error.
Variation in the sampling variance of the observations on the dependent variable will induce heteroscedasticity. Given the two-step procedure, we obtain information on part of this heteroscedasticity. We implement
Hanushek's FGLS method (1974), which takes into account both the variance of the homoscedastic noise and the heteroscedasticity of the sampling errors. Note, however, that we now are no longer able to implement the weighting schemes we apply in the baseline regression to obtain robust regression results. We report the results in column 5 of Table 7 . As in most robustness checks, the results are largely unaffected. Differences insigni cance with respect to the baseline ( rst column of Table 4 ) are only observed for two variables. The coef cients on other operating income and the correlation between shocks to trading and other operating income are signi cant in the baseline but not in this robustness check (though the estimates don't differ signi cantly from one another). We prefer robust regression methods over Hanushek FGLS method as the baseline, since the R-squared is much higher in the former compared to using FGLS. This provides an indication that controlling for outliers and robust standard errors is more important than taking into account the uncertainty introduced by the estimated dependent variable. Second, the paper deals with systemic banking risk and measures tail betas with respect to a European banking index. However, one could easily measure the tail beta of bank stock returns with respect to a general European market index. This measure would provide an indication of extreme systematic risk exposures. In the last column of Table 7 , we replace our proxy of systemic risk with one of extreme systematic risk. That is, the dependent variable now captures the probability that a bank's equity return crashes, conditional on observing a market-wide correction. The results are very similar, which need not be surprising. by rating agencies, that focus on the probability of default and the loss given default. An important aspect of credit risk that is neglected by rating agencies and regulators is the timing of the default or the conditions in which default is likely to happen. Kupiec (2004) remarks that all of the New Basel Accord's proposed capital schemes contain incentives that may encourage banks to purposely concentrate on credits that are expected to default in recessions. Morever, banks may also be inclined to select the timing of default to enhance the value of their deposit insurance guarantee (Kupiec, 2004) . Hence, as long as capital regulation or deposit insurance premiums fail to include a premium for systematic risk, banks will have an incentive to take extreme systematic risks, by engaging in non-interest activities.
Conclusion
The banking sector occupies a central role in every economy and is a particularly important sector for the stability of nancial systems. As a result, central bankers and nancial supervisors invest a great deal of resources in analyzing how to strengthen the nancial system, including the system of nancial regulation and supervision, to reduce the frequency and severity of future bouts of nancial instability. Reliable indicators of banking system stability are of the utmost importance. In this paper, we employ a recent approach to assess banking system risk (Hartmann et al., 2006) . This statistical approach assesses the joint occurrence of very rare events, such as severe banking problems. More speci cally, the bank-speci c systemic risk measure captures the probability of a sharp decline in a bank's stock price conditional on a crash in a European banking sector index. We discover considerable heterogeneity in banks' contributions to overall banking sector stability. This observation should not be surprising in light of some remarkable developments over the last decades. Substantial banking consolidation, the dismantling of the legal barriers to the integration of nancial services, and technological evolution all affected the organizational design of banking rms. These developments initiated the emergence of large and complex banking organizations. Yet some banks continue to specialize in traditional intermediation activities or target local customers.
When relating the tail betas to bank-speci c accounting variables, we can explain a fair amount of the cross-sectional dispersion in extreme bank risk. We establish that the shift to non-traditional banking activities increases banks' tail betas and thus reduces banking system stability because interest income is less risky than all other revenue streams. Moreover, the impact of the alternative revenue shares (commission and fee income, trading income, other operating income) do differ substantially from one another. Other indicators ofbank specialization in traditional intermediation, such as the net interest margin and the loans-to-assets ratio, corroborate the nding that traditional banking activities are less risky. Hence, we can conclude that banks that pro tably focus on lending activities contribute more to banking system stability than diversi ed banks.
This questions the usefulness of nancial conglomeration as a risk diversi cation device, at least in times of stock market turmoil. Retail banks, with a relatively high proportion of core deposits and loans in total assets, have a consistently lower systemic risk exposure. Moreover, as long as capital regulation or deposit insurance premiums fail to include a premium for systematic risk, banks will have an incentive to take extreme systematic risks by engaging in non-interest activities.
The established relationships bear implications for bank supervision. Bank size is by far the most signi cant driver of banks' tail betas. Some particularly thorny issues are raised by the existence of nancial institutions that may be perceived as "too big to fail" and the moral hazard issues that may arise when governments intervene in a nancial crisis. The latter could be perceived as an implicit expansion of the safety net and may exacerbate the problem of "too big to fail," possibly resulting in excessive risk-taking and still greater systemic risk in the future. Moreover, since the large banks are more exposed to European-wide (banking) shocks and economic conditions, their prudential supervision needs to take that feature into account. In Europe, increasing banking sector integration initiated by directives that led to the single market for nancial services further complicated the tasks of national and supranational supervisors. This will be even more the case when banks further increase their cross-border activities, which strengthens the need for an integrated European supervisor for internationally operating banks. For the locally operating banks, supervision at the country level should suf ce to assess the implications of their risk pro le.
In addition, the results are interesting in light of the third pillar of Basel II. Market participants, in addition to armies of regulators, will do some of the work in assessing the overall risk position of the bank. A larger capital buffer decreases a bank's exposure to extreme shocks. This nding is expected and underlines the importance of capital adequacy as a signal of bank creditworthiness. Furthermore, a more complete and coherent disclosure of the different revenue streams facilitates a better understanding of the risks being taken by different institutions.
The debate on the optimality and desirability of universal banking and nancial conglomerates is still unsettled. The unconditional VaR is measured using univariate extreme value analysis. The crash magnitude or VaR corresponds with an event that occurs with a probability of 0.04%. Panel C presents the expected shortfall that corresponds with an event that occurs with a probability of 0.04%. 
t. a European banking sector index
Note: this table contains information on the tail-beta for the set of listed European banks. Tail beta measures the probability of a crash in bank stock conditional on a crash in a European banking sector index. The tail-betas are obtained using the Ledford and Tawn approach (1996) . The table reports the time evolution as well as the cross-sectional heterogeneity across the set of listed European banks. The numbers are in percentages. The crashes occur with a probability of 0.04%. on the bank-specific variables used in this paper. The ratios are computed as averages over each 6 year period. The first set of rows contains information on the different revenue shares. The next block contains info on the revenue-based measures of functional diversification. The third block provides information on the distribution of correlation between any pair of growth rates of the four types of bank revenue. The last nine rows provide summary statistics on the other bank-specific variables. The summary statistics provided are computed for the unbalanced panel of bank-time observations of the commercial banks and bank holding companies. Note: The table presents information on the stability of the baseline results in various subsamples. In columns 1 to 3, we redo the analysis of the baseline regression for smaller subsamples. We rank banks according to size and divide them into three equally large samples. Column 1 reports the results for the small banks subsample (first tertile), column 2 contains the medium-sized banks (second tertile), while large banks (third tertile) constitute the sample in the third column. In column 4, we extend the sample and include fast-growing banks and specialized banks (banks with a share of non-interest income larger than 90%). In column 5, we show results when implementing FGLS (Hanushek, 1974) . This method allows for correcting for heteroscedasticity induced by using estimated dependent variables. In the regression of the sixth column, the dependent variable provides an indication of extreme systematic risk, i.e. the tail beta of bank stock returns with respect to the returns on a broad European market index (over a period of six year). The tail-beta is a probability and hence bound between [0,1]. Therefore, we employ a generalized linear model, estimated using quasi-maximum likelihood. The independent variables are averages over a six year interval to match the time interval over which the dependent variable is estimated. We apply robust regression techniques to mitigate the effect of outliers in the dataset. In each regression, we include time dummies as well as country fixed effects. Standard errors take into account groupwise heteroscedasticity.
